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We develop a framework in which the host country productivity has a positive effect on the intensive
margin (the size of FDI flows), but only an ambiguous effect on the extensive margin (the likelihood
of FDI flows to occur). The source-country productivity has a negative effect on the extensive margin.
An increase in the host-country corporate tax rate reduces the actual FDI flows the likelihood of such
flows to occur. An increase in the source-country corporate tax rate  reduces the likelihood of FDI
flows.  These predictions are confronted with  Data on FDI flows, drawn from the International Direct
Investment dataset (Source OECD), covering the bilateral FDI flows among 18 OECD countries over
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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form of international capital flows. It plays an 
important role in the general allocation of world capital across countries. It is often 
pictured, together with other forms of capital flows, as shifting capital from rich, capital-
abundant economies to poor, capital-scarce economies, so as to close the gap between the 
rates of return to capital and enhance the efficiency of the worldwide stock of capital. 
This general portrayal of international capital flows may indeed pertain to FDI flows 
from developed countries to developing countries. The latter are almost all net recipients 
of FDI. 
  However, this portrayal of international capital flow is hardly reminiscent of the 
FDI flows among developed countries, which are much larger than those from developed 
to developing countries. Although net aggregate FDI flows from, or to, a developed 
country are typically small, the gross flows are quite large. 
  In this paper we indeed focus on bilateral FDI flows among OECD countries. We 
study the effects of two sets of driving forces that affect FDI: productivity and taxation. 
Specifically, we attempt to shed some light on some key mechanisms though which these 
sets affect FDI flows.
1 
  An important feature of our FDI model (which distinguishes FDI flows from 
portfolio flows) is fixed setup costs of new investments. This introduces two margins of 
                                            
1 Some macroeconomic studies emphasize the effect of FDI on long-run economic growth and cyclical 
fluctuations. A comprehensive study by Bosworth and Collins (1999) studies a somewhat related effect: 
that of FDI on growth. They provide evidence on the effect of capital inflows on domestic investment for 
58 developed countries during 1978-1995.   3 
FDI decisions. There is an intensive margin of determining the magnitude of the flows of 
FDI, according to standard marginal productivity conditions, and also an extensive 
margin of determining whether at all to make a new investment. Crucially, productivity 
and taxes may affect these two margins in different, possibly conflicting, ways. The 
magnitude of the setup costs can well be industry-specific, thereby giving rise to two-way 
rich-rich, as well as rich-poor FDI flows. 
  Threshold barriers play also an important role in determining the extent of trade-
based foreign direct investment; see, for instance, Zhang and Markusen (1999), Carr, 
Markusen and Maskus (2001), and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). The trade-based 
literature typically focuses on issues such as the interdependence of FDI and trade in 
goods and the ensuing industrial structure. For instance, they attempt to explain how a 
source country can export both FDI and goods to the same host country. The explanation 
essentially rests on productivity heterogeneity within the source country, and differences 
in setup costs associated with FDI and export of goods. The trade-based literature on FDI 
is based on a framework of heterogeneous firms, such as in Melitz (2003). Thus, the 
empirical approach in this literature is geared toward firm-level decisions on exports and 
FDI in the source country. Our approach is geared toward an analysis of aggregate 
bilateral FDI. Thus, trade-based empirical applications typically use micro-dataset, 
whereas we utilize countrywide datasets. Note that micro-cross-country panel datasets are 
not available, so that micro-based empirical studies typically have to be confined to a 
single source or host country and to extremely short time spans. In contrast, we employ 
here data for 19 OECD countries over a large interval of time (1987-2003).   4 
  We first study the role of source and host productivities on the two-fold FDI 
decisions. Specifically, we develop a framework in which the host country productivity 
has a positive effect on the intensive margin (the size of FDI flows), but an ambiguous 
effect on the extensive margin (the likelihood of FDI flows to occur). The source-country 
productivity has a negative effect on the extensive margin. These predictions are 
confronted with the data. 
  We then study the effects of corporate taxation on FDI. Earlier studies (e.g. Gropp 
and Kostial (2000) and Benassy-Quere, Fontagae and Laahreche-Révil (2000)) suggest 
that FDI is sensitive to tax rate differences. Our contribution is that the host and source 
tax rates may have differential effects on the two margins of FDI decisions. Therefore, 
the sensitivity of FDI to tax rate differentials may be blurred. 
  The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an analytical 
framework with productivity as a driving force of FDI. Section 3 extends this framework 
to include corporate taxation as an additional driving force. Section 4 describes our 
econometric approach. Section 5 describes the data. The estimations results are presented 
in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. A Stripped-Down Model of FDI 
 
Datasets of source-host FDI flows typically include many observations with zero 
flows. This may be indicative of the existence of fixed setup costs of establishing new 
FDI, thereby generating two margins for FDI decisions - an extensive margin about   5 
whether to invest all, and an intensive margin of about how much to invest.  
We present in this section a simple, stripped-down model of FDI with fixed setup 
costs. Consider a pair of countries, "host" and "source", in a world of free capital mobility 
which fixes the world rate of interest, denoted by r . We will now describe the host-
country, whose economic variables will be subscripted by "H ". The description of the 
source-country is similar with a subscript "S ". Variables with neither subscript are 
identical for the two countries. There is a representative industry whose product serves 
for both consumption and investment. Firms last for two periods. In the First period there 
is a continuum of  H N   firms which differ from each other by an idiosyncratic productivity 
factor ε . The number  H N   of firms (or entrepreneurs) is fixed. We refer to a firm which 
has a productivity factor of ε  as an ε -firm. The cumulative distribution function of ε  is 
denoted by  ( ) G ⋅  with a density function  ( ) g ⋅ . That is, the number of ε -firms is 
( ) H N g ε . 
We assume for simplicity that the initial net capital stock of each firm is the same 
and denote it by 
0
H K . If an ε -firm invests  I  in the first period, it augments its capital 
stock to 
0
H K K I = + , and its gross output in the second period will be  ( , )(1 ) H A F K L ε + , 
where L is the labor input,  ( ) F ⋅  is the production function, and  H A  is a country ( ) H -
specific aggregate productivity parameter. Note that ε  is firm-specific, whereas  H A  is 
country-specific. 
We assume that there is a fixed setup cost of investment,  H C , which is the same 
for all firms (that is, independent of ε ). We assume that the fixed cost has two 
components. One component (denoted by  SH C ) is borne by the FDI investor in her   6 
C
H SH H H C C w L = +
source-country. This may involve, for instance, management time and other expenses at 
the home headquarter of a multinational. The second component is a standard 
“adjustment cost” carried out in the host country. We assume that this cost involves labor 
input 
C
H L  only. Thus,  
                                                                                      ,    ( 1 ) 
where  H w  is the host-country wage rate. We assume that, due to some (suppressed) fixed 
factor,  F  is strictly concave, exhibiting diminishing returns to scale, and diminishing 
marginal products of labor and capital. Note that the average cost curve of the firm is U-
shaped, so that perfect competition, which we assume, can prevail.
2 Consider an ε -firm 
that invests in the first period an amount 
0
H I K K = −  in order to augment its stock of 
capital to K . Its present value becomes 
0 ( , , , ) H H H H V A K w C ε
+ − , where 
 
( 2 ) 
where δ  is the rate of physical depreciation and r  is the world (fixed) rate of interest. 
  The demands of such a firm for  K  and L are denoted by  ( , , ) H H K A w ε
+  and 
( , , ) H H L A w ε
+ . They are given by the marginal productivity conditions 
( , )(1 ) H K A F K L r ε δ + = +  
( 3 ) 
and  
( , )(1 ) H L H A F K L w ε + = , 
( 4 ) 
                                            
2 With constant returns to scale, the fixed cost will entail diminishing average cost curve, in which case 
perfect competition cannot be sustained, Were we to assume that entry is free, one could have constant 




( , )(1 ) (1 )
( , , , ) max
1
H
H H H H K L
A F K L wL K




+ + − + −   = − −  
+    7 
where  K F  and  L F  denote the partial derivatives of  F  with respect to  K  and L, 
respectively. Naturally, ε  is the bounded from below by -1, so that output is always 
nonnegative. We denote by ε  the upper bound of the productivity factor, that is 
( ) 1 G ε = .  
  Note, however, that an ε -firm may choose not to invest at all (that is, to stick to 
its existing stock of capital, 
0
H K ) and avoid the lumpy setup cost  H C . Naturally, a firm 
with a low ε   may not find it worthwhile to incur the setup cost  H C . In this case, its 
present value is 
0 0
0 ( , )(1 ) (1 )
( , , , ) max
1
H H H H
H H H L
A F K L w L K








( 5 ) 
The labor demand of such a firm, denoted by 
0 ( , , , ) H H H L A K w ε
− , is defines by 
0 ( , )(1 ) H L H H A F K L w ε + = . 
( 6 ) 
A firm will choose to make a new investment if its present value with the investment 
exceeds its present value without the investment. Naturally, a higher productivity firm 
(namely, a firm with a higher ε ) benefits more from investment; that is, the gap between 
V
+ and V
− increases with ε  (a formal proof is available in Razin and Sadka (2007) ). 
Therefore, there exists a cutoff level of ε , denoted by  0 ε , such that an ε -firm will make 
a new investment if, and only if,  0 ε ε > . This cutoff level of ε  depends on 
0 , , H H H A C K , 
and  H w . We write the cutoff ε  as 
0
0( , , , ) H H H H A C K w ε . It is defined implicitly by 
0 0
0 0 ( , , , ) ( , , , ) H H H H H H H V A K w C V A K w ε ε
+ − − = . 
( 7 )   8 
That is, the cutoff productivity level is the level at which the firm is just indifferent 
between making a new investment, incurring the setup cost, and sticking to its existing 
capital stock, avoiding the setup cost. 
  The wage rate  H w  is determined in equilibrium by a clearance in the labor 
market. We assume that labor is confined within national borders. Denoting the country’s 
endowment of labor by 
0
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( 9 ) 
where 
0 0
H H H L L N ≡  is the amount of labor per firm. (Note that there are  [ ] 0 1 ( ) H N G ε −  
firms that make new investments, employing an extra fixed input of 
C
H L .) 
  Note that no similar marker-clearing equation is specified for capital, because we 
assume that capital is freely mobile internationally and its rate of return (n) is equalized 
internationally. The same description with the subscript S  replacing  H  holds for the 
source-country.    9 
  Note that differences in labor abundance between the two countries are 
manifested in the wage differences. To see this, suppose that the two countries are 
identical, except that effective labor per firm is more abundant in the host-country than in 
the source-country, that is 
0 0
H S L L > . Note also that the number of firms in the economy is 
also a measure of the abundance of entrepreneurship. Thus, the abundance (respectively, 
scarcity) of labor is also relative to the scarcity (respectively, abundance) of 
entrepreneurship. If wages were equal in the two countries, then labor demand per firm 
would be equal and the market-clearing condition (equation (8)) could not hold for both 
countries. Because of the diminishing marginal product of labor, it follows that the wage 
in the relatively labor-abundant country is lower than in the relatively labor-scarce 
country, that is  H S w w < .





2.1 M&A FDI 
 
One may think of FDI as the investment of source-country entrepreneurs in the 
acquisition of host-country existing firms (whose number is fixed -  H N ). We indeed deal 
initially with this kind of FDI through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Suppose that the 
                                            
3 The equilibrium wage gap implies that the host-country employs more workers per firm than the source-
country. Thus, even though the productivity distribution across firms is assumed equal, the source-country 
is effectively more productive in equilibrium.  
4 See also Amiti (2005) who studies the effect of agglomeration on cross-regional wage differences. See 
also Melitz (2003) for the role of fixed costs in intra-industry reallocations in reaction to industry-specific 
productivity shocks.   10 
source-country entrepreneurs are endowed with some "intangible" capital, or know-how, 
stemming from their specialization or expertise in the industry at hand. We model this 
comparative advantage by assuming that the setup cost of investment in the host-country, 
when investment is done by source- country entrepreneurs (FDI investors) is only 
C
H SH H H C C w L
∗ ∗ ∗ = + , which is below  H C  (the setup cost of investment when carried out by 
the host-country direct investors). This cost advantage implies that the foreign investors 
can bid up the direct investors of the host-country in the purchase of the investing firms 
in the host-country. Each such firm (that is, each firm whose ε  is above 
0
0( , , , ) H H H H A C K w ε
∗ ) is purchased at its market value, which is 
0 ( , , , ) H H H H V A K w C ε
+ ∗ − . 
This essentially assumes that competition among the foreign direct investors shifts all the 
gains from their lower setup cost to the host-country original owners of the firm. The new 
owners also invest an amount 
0 ( , , ) H H H K A w K ε
+ −   in the firm.  
            Thus, the amount of foreign direct investment made in an ε -firm (where  0 ε ε > ) 
is  
0 0 0 ( , , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , ) . H SH H H H H H SH H H H FDI A C K w V A K w C K A w K ε ε ε
∗ + ∗ + = − + −  
( 10 ) 
Note that the acquisition price is 
C
SH H H V C w L
∗ + ∗ − − , but 
C
H H w L
∗
  constitutes part of FDI; 
therefore only  SH C
∗  is subtracted in equation ( 10 ). 
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∗ ∗ ∗ = ∫  
( 11 )   11 
Note that  N FDI , as defined in equation ( 11 ), would be the actual flow of FDI, when 
0
0( , , , ) H H H H A C K w ε
∗  is below  ε . That is,  N FDI  is the actual FDI only if  
0
0( , , , ) H H H H A C K w ε ε
∗ ≤ . 
( 12 ) 
Otherwise, the actual FDI would be zero. For this reason we refer to  N FDI  as the 
notional FDI. The actual FDI, denoted by  A FDI , is therefore defined by: 
0
0
( , , , , ) if (12) holds
( , , , , )
0 otherwise
N H H SH H H
A H H SH H H
FDI A C C K w









( 13 ) 
We refer to ( 12 ) as the selection-condition equation. It specifies when there will by any 
FDI flow to the host-country. Equation ( 11 ) is referred to as the flow equation which 
describes the actual FDI flow only if the selection-condition equation is satisfied. 
 
2.2 Aggregate Productivity Shock: Flow and Selection 
 
  Note that the parameter  H A  is a host-country specific productivity factor that 
applies to all firms in this country. We examine how a shock to this factor affects the 
aggregate level of FDI flowing to the host-country. Suppose first that the domestic wage 
rate ( H w ) is fixed. A positive productivity shock has three positive effects on the notional 
FDI (namely,  N FDI ), as specified in equation ( 11 ). First, it raises the marginal 
productivity of capital, thereby increasing the amount of investment that is made by each 
investing firm (which is acquired by FDI investors). Second, it raises the value of such 
firms and, consequently, their acquisition price which constitutes a part of the notional   12 
FDI flows. Third, it increases the number of firms purchased by FDI investors (by 
lowering the threshold productivity level  0 ε ). 
5,6 
  Turning to the selection-condition equation ( 13 ), note that a positive aggregate 
productivity shock (while still maintaining the wage rate  H w  constant) increases the 
profitability of investments and, consequently, reduces the likelihood that no firm will 
make any investment. Formally, a rise in  H A  reduces the likelihood that the threshold 
idiosyncratic productivity  0 ε  exceeds the upper bound on the idiosyncratic productivity 
ε . That is, a positive aggregate productivity shock raises the likelihood of satisfying the 
selection condition, so that the notional FDI turns to be realized.  
  Thus, a positive aggregate productivity shock, keeping  H w  fixed, raises the actual 
FDI (both through the flow and selection-condition equation). 
Now, we drop the supposition that the wage rate  H w  is fixed. When wages are not 
fixed (but are rather determined by the labor-market clearing equation ( 9 ) ), then the 
increase in the demand for labor raises the wage rate ( H w ) in the host-country (and the 
fixed setup cost 
C
H H w L ), thereby countering the above three effects on the notional FDI.  
With a unique equilibrium, the initial effects of the increase in  H A  are likely to dominate 
the subsequent counter-effects of the rise in  H w , so that the notional FDI still rises. Thus, 
an increase in the host-country’s aggregate productivity factor ( H A ) raises the volume of 
                                            
5 For a formal derivation of the results see Razin and Sadka (2007). 
6 We assume plausibly that the third effect which represents the marginal investing firm is rather small 
relative to the margin of investment of all investing firms (the first effect). We ignore the third effect in the 
empirical investigation.    13 
the notional FDI flows from country S to country H that is governed by the flow 
equation. 
  Next, consider the effect of an aggregate productivity shock on the selection 
condition equation. A rise in  H A  increases the value of the domestic component of the 
setup cost, 
C
H H w L . This effect by itself weakens the advantage of carrying out positive 
FDI flows from country S to country H at all. In other words, as  H w  rises,  0 ε  rises, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of satisfying the selection-condition equation. The 
follow-up effect that is triggered by a positive aggregate productivity shock works in the 
opposite direction of the initial effect (holding  H w  constant), and may dominate it. 
  To sum up, a positive aggregate productivity shock in the host-country raises the 
observed notional FDI flows in the flow equation and, at the same time, may lower the 
likelihood of observing positive FDI flows at all. Indeed, this possibility is demonstrated 
in Razin and Sadka (2007).  
Note also that the source-country aggregate productivity factor ( S A ) does not 
affect the flows of M&A FDI from country S to country H. This is because we assumed 




2.3 Greenfield FDI 
 
 
  So far, FDI has taken the form of mergers or acquisitions of the  H N  existing 
firms. Consider now the possibility of establishing a new firm (that is, a greenfield FDI,   14 
where 
0 0 H K = ). Suppose that the newcomer entrepreneur does not know in advance the 
productivity factor (ε ) of the potential firm. The entrepreneur therefore takes  ( ) G ⋅ as the 
cumulative probability distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity factor of the new 
firm. However, we assume that ε  is revealed to the entrepreneur, before she decides 
whether or not to make new investment. The expected value of the new firm is therefore:  
1





= − ∫  
( 14 ) 
where  nH C  is the setup cost of greenfield investment. Note that when 
0
H K  is equal to 
zero, only the firms with ε  high enough to justify a greenfield investment have a positive 
value. This explains the max operator in equation ( 14 ). 
 
Suppose that greenfield entrepreneurship is in limited capacity. Thus, an 
entrepreneur in a source country (and there are a limited number of them) may have to 
decide whether to establish a new firm at home (the source country) or abroad (the host 
country), but not in both. Her decision is naturally determined by where  ( ) V ⋅ , as defined 
in equation ( 14 ), is higher. She will invest in the host-country rather than in the source-
country if, and only if, 
( , , ) ( , , ) . H nH H S nS S V A C w V A C w
∗ ∗ >  
( 15 ) 
(We continue to maintain the assumption that the source-country entrepreneurs have a 
cutting-edge advantage over their counterparts in the host-country in establishing 
greenfield investments.) 
   15 
This is a selection-condition equation for greenfield FDI. In contrast to the M&A 
case, there is a role played here by the aggregate productivity factor in the source-country 
( S A ). A positive shock to  S A  increases the likelihood of the source-country entrepreneurs 
of staying at home, thereby reducing the likelihood of greenfield FDI flows from country 
S to H. 
Note that in a many-country world, an entrepreneur from source country S 
chooses to invest in host country H, if the latter offers the most profitable investment. 
Also, she may need to outbid competitors from other source countries (for instance, in the 
case of acquiring a concession from the host-country government to operate something ). 
In this case,  ( , , ) H nH H V A C w
∗  in the selection-condition equation ( 15 ) must be the 
maximum over all  ( ', ', ') H nH H V A C w
∗  for potential other host countries: 
' ( , , ) argmax ( ', ', ') ( , , ),
H D H nH H H nH H S S S V A C w V A C w V A C w
∈
∗ ∗ ∗ = >  
( 15’ ) 
 
where D is the set of potential host countries in which the entrepreneurs of source-
country S can outbid all competing entrepreneurs from other potential source countries.
7 
  Each entrepreneur in the source country, who decides to actually make a 
greenfield FDI in host-country H, invests according to the marginal productivity 
conditions. Aggregation over these entrepreneurs from source-country S provides a flow 
equation of greenfield FDI from S to H. 
  As we have seen, the host-country aggregate productivity factor ( H A ) affects 
positively the notional FDI flows from source countries in the case of M&A flows; 
                                            
7 Eaton and Kortum (2002) applied the probability theory of extremes to provide a tractable form for a 
selection-condition equation in a similar context.   16 
whereas the source-country aggregate productivity factor ( S A ) has no effect on these 
flows. At the same time, a positive shock to  H A   may reduce the likelihood of having 
M&A FDI flows to the host-country H (because of general equilibrium effects on wages 
in the host-country); again,  S A   has no effects on these flows. In the case of greenfield 
FDI, a positive shock to  H A   has positive effects both on the notional FDI flows to host-
country H and on the likelihood of these flows to actually materialize. A positive shock to 
S A  does not affect the notional flows to host-country H, but it reduces the likelihood of 
such flows to occur at all. Note also that the likelihood of having greenfield FDI flows 
from country S to country H is negatively affected by positive productivity shocks in all 
other potential host countries ( ' H A ).
8 
 
3. Source and Host Corporate Taxation 
 
 
  The economic literature has dealt extensively with the effects of taxation on 
investment, going back to the well-known works of Harbeger (1962) and Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967). Of particular interest are the effects of international differences in tax 
rates on foreign direct investment; see, for instance, Auerbach and Hassett (1993), Hines 
(1999), Desai and Hines (2001), De Mooij and Ederveen (2001), and Devereux and 
Hubbard (2003).  
In this section we attempt to provide a new look at the mechanisms through which 
corporate tax rates influence aggregate FDI flows in the setup adopted here of twofold 
                                            
8 A comprehensive study of the latter effects ( ' H A ) is not available. We ignore these effects in the 
empirical investigation.   17 
investment decisions in the presence of threshold barriers. In this context, the source and 
host tax rates may have different effects on these two decisions (the flow and selection- 
condition equations). 
Consider for concreteness the case of a parent firm that weighs the development 
of a new product line. We can think of the fixed setup cost as the outlays of developing 
this product line. The firm may choose to make the development at home and then carry 
the production at a subsidiary abroad. This choice may be determined by some "genuine" 
economic considerations such as source and host aggregate productivity factors, as 
discussed in the preceding section, and by tax considerations. 
In this context there arises the issue of double taxation. The income of a foreign 
affiliate is typically taxed by the host country. If the source country taxes this income too, 
then the combined (double) tax rate may be very high, and even exceeds 100%.
9 This 
double taxation is typically relieved at the source country by either exempting foreign-
source income altogether or granting tax credits.
10 In the former case, foreign-source 
income is subject to the tax levied by the host country only. When the source country 
taxes its residents on their world-wide income and grants full credit for foreign taxes 
(residence taxation), then in principle the foreign-source income is taxed at the source-
country tax rate, so that the host-country tax rate becomes irrelevant for investment 
decisions the source-country residents. But, in practice, foreign-source income is far from 
being taxed at the source-country rate. First, there are various reduced tax rates for 
foreign-source income. Second, foreign-source income is usually taxed only upon 
                                            
9 For a succinct review of this issue see, for example, Hines (2001).  
10 This is also the recommendation of the OECD model tax treaty (OECD, 1997). A similar 
recommendation is made also by the United Nations model tax treaty (UN 1980).   18 
repatriation, thereby effectively reducing the present value of the tax. Thus, in practice, 
the host country tax rate is much relevant for investment decisions of the parent firm at 
the source country. The relevance of the host-country tax rate intensifies through transfer 
pricing.
11 
  Note that one of the major elements through which corporate taxation affects 
investment decision is the treatment of depreciation.
12 Denote the true rate of 
depreciation in host country H by  H δ , and the rate allowed for tax purposes by 
'
H δ . 





[ ( , )(1 ) ](1 ) (1 )
( , , , , ) max ,
1 (1 )
H H H H H H
H H H H H K L
H
A F K L w L K K
V A K w K K
r
ε τ τ δ δ
τ ε
τ
+   + − − + + −
= − −  
+ −  
 ( 16 ) 
where  H τ  is the host-country corporate tax rate. Note that in the presence of taxation, the 
discount rate is the after-tax rate  (1 ) H r τ − − . (This specification assumes that the 
subsidiary uses debt in the host country to finance the new investment.) Employing the 
envelope theorem, it follows from equation ( 16 ) that  / 0 H V τ
+ ∂ ∂ < . That is, the present 
value of the cash flow falls when the corporate-tax rate in the host country rises, as is 
indeed expected. Furthermore, the amount of new investment depends negatively on  H τ . 
The first-order condition for the stock of capital (equation ( 3 )) now becomes 
'













( 17 ) 
                                            
11 The 2005 Jobs Creation Act in the U.S. allows U.S. companies to pay merely a tax of 5.25% on their 
foreign-source income. 
12 See, for instance, Auerbach (1983).   19 
This latter equation defines (implicitly) an equation for the flow of FDI. As 
'
H δ  is 
typically smaller than  H δ , it follows that the flow of FDI declines in  H τ . 
  The source-country parent firm will indulge into the project if, and only if,  
0 (1 ) (1 ) ( , , , , ) ,
C
H H H HS S H H H H w L C V A K w τ τ τ ε
∗ ∗ + − + − <  
( 18 ) 
where  S τ  is the corporate tax rate in the source country. Recall that 
C
H H w L
∗
 and  HS C
∗  are, 
respectively, the host-country and source-country components of the fixed cost  H C
∗ .  
  To sum up: as is evident from condition ( 18 ), the tax rate in the source country, 
S τ , affects positively the decision by a parent firm in country S whether to carry out a 
foreign direct investment in country H; the tax rate in the host country,  H τ , has a negative 
effect on this decision. The tax rate in the source country,  S τ , is irrelevant for the 
determination of the magnitude of FDI flows; the latter are negatively affected by  H τ . 
  As before, there is a cutoff productivity level, denoted by 
0
0( , , , , , , , )
C
H H H HS H H S H A C L C K w ε τ τ
∗ ∗ , such that all firms with a firm-specific productivity 
level above  0 ε  will make new investment and be acquired by FDI investors. All other 
firms will make no new investments and remain under domestic ownership. The cutoff 
level of  0 ε  is defined implicitly by ( 18 ) with the inequality sign is replaced by an 
equality sign. It follows from equation ( 18 ) that an increase in the source-country 
corporate tax rate ( S τ ) reduces  0 ε , so that more firms are purchased by FDI investors. 
The reason for this is that a rise in  S τ  reduces the after-tax source-country component of 
the fixed cost. Note that V
+ declines in  H τ .  But a rise in  H τ  reduces also the after-tax,   20 
host-country component of the fixed cost (namely,  (1 )
C
H H H w L τ
∗
− ). However, if the first 
effect dominates the second, which is plausible, then an increase in  H τ  raises  0 ε ; that is, 
an increase in the host-country corporate-tax rate reduces the number of investing firms 
(which are also purchased by FDI investors). 
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( 19 ) 
where, as before, 
0
0 0
( , , , , , , , )
( , , , , ) (1 ) ( , , , ) ,
C
H SH H H H H S H
H H H H SH S H H H H
FDI A C w L K w
V A K w C K A w K
τ τ ε




− − + −
 
( 20 ) 
and where  K
+ is implicitly defined by equation ( 17 ). 
The actual FDI will be equal to the notional FDI only when  0 ε  is below ε : 
 
0
0( , , , , , , ) .
C
H H H HS H H S H A w L C K w ε τ τ ε
∗ ∗ ≤  
( 21 ) 
The latter in the selection-condition equation. The actual flow of FDI ( H FDI ) is thus 
0
0
( , , , , , , )
( , , , , , , ) if condition (21) holds
0 otherwise
C
A H H H SH H H S H
C
N H H H SH H H S H
FDI A w L C K w














( 22 )   21 
Note that an increase in the host-country corporate tax rate ( H τ ) reduces the 
actual FDI flows from S to H and the likelihood of such flows to occur. An increase in 





4. Econometric Approach 
 
The twofold nature of FDI decision gives rise to many cases of zero actual FDI flows.  
With n countries in a sample, there are potentially n(n-1) pairs of source-host (s,h) 
countries. In fact, the actual number of (s,h) pairs with observed flows is typically much 
smaller. Therefore, the selection of the actual number of (s,h) pairs, which is naturally 
endogenous, cannot be ignored; that is, this selection cannot be taken as exogenous. This 
feature of FDI decisions lends itself naturally to the application of the Heckman selection 
model (1974, 1979). This selection bias method is adopted to jointly estimate the 
likelihood of surpassing a certain threshold (the selection-condition equation) and the 
magnitude of the FDI flow (the flow equation), provided that the threshold is indeed 
surpassed. 
Failing to take into account the selection-condition equation, by either dropping 
out observations with zero flows or by treating such observations as literally indicating 
zero flows, results in biased estimates of the coefficients of the flow equation. In 
addition, the selection-condition equation per se provides meaningful economic 
                                            
13 As before, we ignore the extensive margin effect of  S τ  in the flow equation.   22 
information about the determinants of FDI flows through the likelihood of having such 
flows at all. For a more detailed analysis – see Razin and Sadka (2007, chapter 7).  
  Figure 1 explains the intuition for the cause of the bias. Suppose, for instance, that 
ijt x  is an explanatory variable which measures the productivity differential between the  
i-th source country and the potential j-th host country in period t, holding all other 
explanatory variables constant. Our theory predicts that the parameter  x β  is positive. This 
is shown by the upward sloping line AB. Note that the slope is an estimate of the "true" 
marginal effect of  ijt x  on  ijt Y
∗, the latent variable denoting the flow of notional FDI from 
the source country i to host country j in period t. But recall that flows could also be equal 
to zero, if the setup costs are sufficiently high. A threshold, which is derived from the 
setup costs, is shown as the curve TT’ in Figure 1. However, if we discard observations 
with zero actual FDI flows, the remaining sub-sample is no longer random. 
To illustrate, suppose that for high values of  ijt x  (say, 
H x  in Figure 1), (i, j) pair-
wise FDI flows are all positive. That is, for all pairs of countries in the sub-sample the 
threshold is surpassed and the observed average of notional FDI flows for 
H
ijt x x =  is also 
equal to the conditional population average for FDI flows, point R on line AB. However, 
suppose that this does not hold for low values of  ijt x (say,
L x ). For these (i, j)-pairs, we 
observe positive values of  , , i j t Y , the observed actual flow of FDI, only for a subset of 
country pairs in the population.
14 Point S is, for instance, excluded from the sub-sample 
of positive FDI flows. Consequently, for low  ijt x ’s, we observe only flows between 
                                            
14 This will be indeed the case when the residuals in the flow and selection equations are positively 
correlated. An opposite bias occurs in the case of a negative correlation.   23 
country pairs with low setup costs. As a result, the observed average of the FDI flows is 
at point M’, whereas the "true" average is at point M. As seen in Figure 1, the OLS 
regression line for the sub-sample is therefore the A’B’ line, which underestimates the 
effect of productivity differentials on bilateral FDI flows.  
If we do not discard the zero FDI flow observations, the OLS estimates of β  are 
still biased, because they are based on observations on Y, the actual FDI, rather than on 
Y*, the notional FDI. 
 
 
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We consider several potential explanatory variables of the twofold decisions on FDI 
flows. As in Razin and Sadka (2007), these variables include standard "mass" variables 
(the source and host population sizes); "distance" variables (physical distance between 
the source and the host countries and whether or not the two countries share a common 
language); and "economic" variables (source and host real GDP per capita, source-host 
differences in average years of schooling, and source and host financial risk rating). We 
also control for country and time fixed effects. The dependent variable in the flow  
equation is the log of the FDI flows. (The flow equation is also known as the “gravity” 
equation.) 
The main variables are grouped as follows: (1) standard country characteristics 
such as real GDP per-capita, population size, educational attainment (as measured by 
average years of schooling), and financial sound rating (the inverse of financial risk   24 
rating); (2) (s,h) source-host characteristics, such as (s,h) FDI flows, geographical 
distance, common language (zero-one variable); (3) productivity; and (4) corporate tax 
rates. Productivity is approximated by labor productivity, that is, output per worker, as 
measured by PPP-adjusted real GDP per worker. This variable is at times instrumented 
by the capital/labor ratio and years of schooling.  Corporate taxes are measured by the 
statutory rates or by the “effective” average rates, as compiled y Devereux, Griffith and 
Klemm (2002). The effective rates are at times instrumented by the statutory corporate 
tax rates and GDP per capita. 
Table 1 summarizes the data sources. Table 1A in the appendix describes the list 
of the countries in the sample and indicates for each host-source pair the (time) average 
of FDI flows as percentages of the host and source GDP. Some source countries do not 
interact with more than with few host countries. We do not smooth the data by taking 
multi-year averages, but rather employ unfiltered annual data. This enables us to 
investigate the effects of the explanatory variables over the business cycle. In the text we 
present in Table 2 some aggregate statistics of the detailed country-pair data of Table 2A. 
Specifically, we consider all the EU countries, except the U.K. and Ireland, as one block 
of countries. We then present (time) average flows among this block, the U.K., the 
U.S., Ireland, and Japan as percentages of the host and source country/block GDP. This 
underscores the prominence of the U.S. as a source of FDI and the U.K., Ireland and 
Japan as recipients of FDI. Note that the EU (excluding the U.K. and Ireland) plays a 
relatively small role either as a source or host of FDI.  
Data on FDI flows are drawn from the International Direct Investment dataset 
(Source OECD), covering the bilateral FDI flows among 18 OECD countries over the   25 
period 1987 to 2003.
15 The source OECD dataset reports FDI flows from OECD 
countries to OECD and non-OECD countries, as well as FDI flows from non-OECD 
countries to OECD countries. However, it does not report FDI flows from non-OECD to 
non-OECD countries. This is why we employ in our sample OECD countries only. The 
Source OECD provides data on FDI flows in U.S. dollars, and we deflate them by the 
U.S. CPI for urban consumers. 
 
 
6. Empirical Evidence 
 
As was mentioned before, productivity is taken as one of the drivers of FDI. Note that 
productivity is measured here by labor productivity. However, because both the latter and 
FDI flows are affected by other variables which are not controlled in the regression, such 
as business-cycle variables (e.g. interest rates, unemployment rate), we present in our 
results alternatives. In the first we simply employ labor productivity. In the second we 
instrument the labor productivity variable by the capital-labor ratio, years of schooling 
and country fixed effects.  
As for the tax variables we employ first the statutory tax rates. Another alternative 
is the effective tax rates as compiled by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002). These 
rates measure the gap between the cost of capital in the corporate sector (that is, the 
required rate of return on an investment) and the tax-free interest rate.  For the same 
reasons as in the case of productivity, we also use the statutory corporate tax rates, GDP 
                                            
15 Razin and Sadka (2007) use also samples containing both OECD and non-OECD countries.   26 
per capita and country-fixed effects as instruments to generate fitted values for the 
effective tax rates. 
Table 2A in the appendix presents the instrumented productivity and tax 
equations. As expected, the coefficients of the capital-labor ratio and years of schooling 
are positive and significant in the instrumented productivity equation. Similarly, the 
statutory tax rate and GDP per capita are positive and significant in the instrumented tax 
equation. 
2 R  is very high, close to one, in both equations.  
Consider first productivity as a driver of FDI flows. The estimation results are 
described in Table 3. Panel (1) refers to the uninstrumented productivities, whereas panel 
(2) considers fitted productivities. The coefficients of the variables other than the 
productivity and tax variables are presented “below the line” in this table. Source GDP 
per capita has a positive and significant effect on the flows of FDI in both panels. Host 
GDP per capita has a positive and significant effect on the flow of FDI in panel (2) only. 
Neither host nor source GDP per capita is significant in the selection equation. In 
contrast, the host population size has a negative and significant effect in the selection 
equation only. The source population follows a similar pattern but only in panel (2). As 
expected, the physical distance variable has a negative and significant effect in both 
equations and in both panels. Common language has a positive and significant effect in 
both panels, but only in the flow equation. Turning to the financial sound rating variable 
– it is only the source variable which has a negative (as expected) and significant effect, 
and the flow equation of panel (1) only. The source-host schooling gap is not significant 
throughout. The existence of previous FDI (a dummy variable) may be indicative of low   27 
setup costs. We therefore employ it as an exclusion restriction variable in the selection 
equation. Indeed, its coefficient is found to be significant and positive. 
We turn now to the variables "above the line" which are at the focus of the 
investigation: the host and source productivity factors, as approximated by outputs per 
worker. In Panel (1) of Table 3 the host output per worker has a positive effect in both the 
flow and selection equations, but it is significant only in the flow equation. Source-
country output per worker has a negative and significant effect on the selection 
mechanism. This result is consistent with the analytical framework developed earlier. 
Noteworthy, the source-country output per worker has also a negative and significant 
effect on the flow of FDI. In Panel (2) of Table 3, with the productivity variables 
instrumented by capital per worker and education attainment, the host productivity is 
positive and significant in both equations. The source productivity has a negative and 
significant affect both in the flow and selection equations. 
All in all, the estimation results are consistent with the prediction of our theory 
that the source productivity has a negative effect on the likelihood of the occurrence of 
FDI, but that the host productivity has an ambiguous effect on this likelihood. 
The effect of productivity on the flow and selection of FDI are depicted in Figures 
2 and 3. Figure 2 depicts the effect of productivity in five host countries (the U.K., 
Ireland, France, Germany and Japan) on the flow of FDI from the U.S.. Throughout, all 
the explanatory variables, except the productivities in these host countries, are held 
constant, at their sample averages. The estimated coefficient of the host productivity 
(which is positive) is used to draw the graphs. The shaded boxes describe the frequencies 
of the productivities in all of these five host countries in the sample. The U.K. exhibits a   28 
high sensitivity of the FDI flows from the U.S. to its productivity, relative to the other EU 
countries and Japan in the "relevant" range (where the sample observations are 
concentrated).  
  In figure 3 we depict the effect of U.S. productivity on the likelihood of 
generating FDI from U.S. to each one of the aforementioned five host countries. This 
effect is negative, but relatively weak in the relevant range. 
 
  Consider next the tax variables. The estimation results are presented in the first 
three panels of Table 4. The first panel refers to the statutory tax rate; the second – to the 
effective tax rates; and the third – to the fitted effective tax rates. As expected, and as 
predicted also by our theory, the host tax rate has a negative and significant effect on the 
flow of FDI in the flow equation in all of these panels. This negative effect rises in 
magnitude when moving from the statutory, to the effective and to the fitted effective tax 
rate. Noteworthy, the source tax rate follows exactly the same pattern: it has a negative 
and significant effect in the flow equation, with the magnitude of the effect rising when 
moving from the statutory, to the effective, and to the fitted effective rate. This result may 
allude to the existence of source residence taxation in the source countries: as the  
source country taxes its residents on their income in the host country, the source country 
tax has a depressing effect on their investment abroad. The source tax rate has a positive 
and significant effect on the selection mechanism, as predicted by our theory, only in 
Panel (1). However, this effect intensifies and becomes even more significant, when we 
consider in Panel (4) a larger set of countries (for which we had data on the statutory 
rates only).   29 
The effect of the statutory tax rates on the flow and selection of FDI are depicted 
in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 depicts the effect of corporate taxes in aforementioned five 
host countries on the flow of FDI from the U.S.. Throughout, all the explanatory 
variables, except the tax rates in these host countries, are held constant, at their sample 
averages. The estimated coefficient of the host tax (which is negative) is used to draw the 
graphs. As before, the shaded boxes describe the frequencies of the productivities in all of 
these five host countries in the sample. The U.K. exhibits a high sensitivity of the FDI 
flows from the U.S. to its tax rate, relative to the other EU countries and Japan, in the 
"relevant" range (where the sample observations are concentrated. 
In figure 5 we depict the effect of the U.S. tax rate on the likelihood of generating 
FDI from U.S. to each one of the aforementioned host countries. This effect is positive 
and relatively strong for Ireland and Japan. 
  Apparently, when we look at the two sets of drivers (productivity and taxation) 
together, there arise some multicolinearity problems. As a result, the estimated results do 
not change much in sign but their statistical significance weakens. We present these 
results in Table 3A in the appendix. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
We study the role of productivity and corporate taxation as driving forces of FDI 
among OECD countries in the presence of threshold barriers, which generate two 
margins for FDI decisions.    30 
Some simulations, based on the estimation results, suggest that there are marked 
differences in the sensitivity of FDI flows from the U.S. to productivity and taxes in 
OECD countries. The sensitivity of these flows to productivity in the U.K. is positive and 
high, relative to other EU countries and Japan. Similarly, the sensitivity of these flows to 
taxes in the U.K is negative and high, relative to other EU countries and Japan.   31 
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Variables  Source 
   
   
FDI Flows  International Direct Investment Database (OECD) 
GDP  World Economic Indicators 
Population  World Economic Indicators 
Number of Workers  World Economic Indicators 
Distance  Andrew Rose website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Common Language  Andrew Rose website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
Education Attainment  Barro-Le Dataset, www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee/ 
ICRG Index of Financial 
Sound Rating (the inverse of            
Financial Risk Rating) 
PRS Group 
Capital Stock  Francesco Caselli website: 
   http://personal.lse.ac.uk/casellif 
Effective Tax Rates  Devereux, Giffith and Klemm (2002) 
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  Table 2: Time Average of FDI Flows                 
   (as percentage of the source and host countries' GDP)               
                           
                           
                           
    Source 
    11 EU members^  United States  United Kingdom  Japan  Ireland  Australia 
    source  host  source  host  source  host  source  host  source  host  source  host 
11 EU members^        0.312869  0.17889  2.376682  0.212644  0.144592  0.043268  3.054325  0.016687  0.13403  0.00359 
United States  0.256095  0.447895       2.113071  0.330653  0.436291  0.228337  2.287701  0.021859  0.627204  0.02938 
United Kingdom  0.158893  1.775918  0.22806  1.457443       0.135544  0.453339  0.801327  0.048932  0.428621  0.128307 
Japan  0.015865  0.053016  0.045511  0.086959  0.060505  0.01809       0.189286  0.003456  0.016369  0.001465 
Ireland  0.03258  5.963265  0.042012  4.396814  0.12974  2.124668  0.007071  0.387289       0.018591  0.091136 
Host 
Australia  0.012581  0.469737  0.033767  0.720863  0.134444  0.449123  0.044343  0.495434  0.065708  0.013404      
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
Note:                           
^ The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Portugal.           40 
Table 3 - Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection Equations: 
Productivity Effect  
         
         
  1  2 
  Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection 
Productivity-source  -0.066  -0.059      
   (0.018)**  (0.024)*      
Productivity-host  0.042  0.014      
   (0.018)*  (0.028)      
Instrumented productivity-
source        -0.080  -0.136 
         (0.033)*  (0.052)** 
Instrumented productivity-
host        -0.012  0.047 
         (0.036)  (0.046) 
GDP per capita - source^  5.812  2.150  3.515  0.996 
   (0.837)**  (1.124)  (0.621)**  (0.667) 
GDP per capita - host^  1.437  -1.532  3.955  -1.452 
   (0.853)  (1.204)  (0.607)**  (0.797) 
Schooling difference  0.093  -0.053  0.002  0.022 
   (0.063)  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.081) 
Common language  0.516  -0.179  0.497  -0.089 
   (0.090)**  (0.118)  (0.106)**  (0.148) 
Distance^  -1.013  -0.305  -1.081  -0.388 
   (0.044)**  (0.074)**  (0.048)**  (0.088)** 
Population-source^  0.754  -3.889  -1.363  -7.880 
   (1.739)  (2.554)  (2.081)  (2.972)** 
Population-host^  -2.764  -5.529  -0.217  -9.043 
   (1.463)  (2.597)*  (1.683)  (3.040)** 
Financial risk-source  -0.030  0.023  -0.017  0.009 
   (0.012)*  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.025) 
Financial risk-host  -0.015  -0.029  -0.019  -0.016 
   (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.020) 
Previous FDI dummy (1 if 
yes)     1.538    1.500 
      (0.085)**     (0.093)** 
Observations  4702  4702  3833  3833 
         
         
         
Note:         
^ In logs;          
Country and time fixed effects are accounted for; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Table 4 - Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection Equations: Tax Effect  
                 
  Panel A  Panel B^^ 
   Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection 
Tax rate-s  1.795  1.656            -0.131  2.418 
   (0.579)**  (0.759)*            (0.652)  (0.904)** 
Tax rate-h  -2.955  -0.504            -1.963  -1.063 
   (0.621)**  (0.694)            (0.734)**  (0.900) 
Effective tax rate-s        2.383  1.331           
         (0.790)**  (1.051)           
Effective tax rate-h        -3.096  0.124           
         (0.841)**  (1.031)           
Instrumented effective 
tax rate-s              2.400  2.047 
     
               (0.912)**  (1.193)       
Instrumented effective 
tax rate-h              -4.536  -0.778 
     
               (0.974)**  (1.093)       
GDP per capita-s^  2.961  -0.498  2.928  -0.443  2.841  -0.581  1.867  -0.053 
   (0.490)**  (0.505)  (0.494)**  (0.511)  (0.507)**  (0.524)  (0.519)**  (0.543) 
GDP per capita-h^  3.235  -0.798  3.186  -0.860  3.493  -0.747  1.814  -0.701 
   (0.460)**  (0.580)  (0.460)**  (0.588)  (0.470)**  (0.595)  (0.495)**  (0.603) 
Schooling difference  0.197  -0.045  0.174  -0.075  0.185  -0.054  -0.068  -0.151 
   (0.065)**  (0.070)  (0.065)**  (0.069)  (0.065)**  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.078) 
Common language  0.516  -0.192  0.518  -0.189  0.517  -0.192  0.609  0.088 
   (0.087)**  (0.114)  (0.087)**  (0.114)  (0.087)**  (0.114)  (0.103)**  (0.130) 
Distance^  -1.005  -0.248  -1.003  -0.246  -1.004  -0.248  -0.970  -0.457 
   (0.043)**  (0.070)**  (0.043)**  (0.070)**  (0.043)**  (0.070)**  (0.046)**  (0.071)** 
Population-s^  -0.114  -4.395  -0.563  -5.064  -0.060  -4.433  -1.364  -1.312 
   (1.588)  (2.220)*  (1.604)  (2.276)*  (1.594)  (2.223)*  (1.599)  (1.813) 
Population-h^  -2.032  -2.845  -1.662  -2.922  -1.906  -2.822  -1.940  -0.466 
   (1.315)  (2.323)  (1.348)  (2.366)  (1.320)  (2.324)  (1.232)  (1.721) 
Financial risk-s  -0.022  0.023  -0.023  0.025  -0.023  0.023  0.002  0.019 
   (0.011)*  (0.018)  (0.011)*  (0.018)  (0.011)*  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Financial risk-h  -0.015  -0.031  -0.017  -0.032  -0.015  -0.032  -0.008  -0.021 
   (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.016)*  (0.011)  (0.016)*  (0.011)  (0.015) 
Previous FDI dummy 
(1 if yes)     1.622     1.626    1.624     0.860 
      (0.083)**     (0.083)**     (0.083)**     (0.108)** 
Observations  4974  4974  4974  4974  4974  4974  3210  3210 
                 
Note:                 
^ In logs;                  
^^This panel relates to corporate tax rate (without local taxes) for additional 5 OECD countries:   
Denmark, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey. Observations are smoothed over 2-3 years period; 
Country and time fixed effects are accounted for; Robust standard errors in parentheses;   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%               42 
Table A.1: Time Average of FDI Flows (as percentage of the source and host countries' GDP)   
                     
  United States  United Kingdom  Austria  Belgium   
 
Source 
source  host  source  host  source  host  source  host   
United States        2.1131  0.3307  0.0503  0.0013  0.1445  0.0043  111 
United Kingdom  0.2281  1.4574        0.0927  0.0147        112 
Austria  0.0055  0.2196  0.0220  0.1385              122 
Belgium  0.0239  0.8078                    124 
France  0.0338  0.1940  0.2495  0.2242  0.0268  0.0038        132 
Germany  0.0520  0.2055  1.0118  0.6259  0.1957  0.0192        134 
Italy  0.0257  0.1779  0.0494  0.0535  0.0415  0.0071        136 
Netherlands  0.1082  11.3238  0.5877  9.6242  0.0610  0.1589        138 
Norway  0.0089  0.4769  0.0504  0.4230  0.0023  0.0030  0.3661  0.5807  142 
Sweden  0.0361  0.0361  0.2852  0.0446  0.0286  0.0007        144 
Switzerland  0.0615  1.8512  0.2500  1.1770  0.0554  0.0415  0.2872  0.2558  146 
Canada  0.1084  1.3516  0.1219  0.2378  0.0122  0.0038  0.1877  0.0693  156 
Japan  0.0455  0.0870  0.0605  0.0181  0.0018  0.0001  0.1545  0.0087  158 
Finland  0.0020  0.1291  0.0158  0.1573  0.0032  0.0050        172 
Greece  0.0008  0.0571  0.0252  0.2841  0.0023  0.0040        174 
Ireland  0.0420  4.3968  0.1297  2.1247  0.0237  0.0616        178 
Portugal  0.0032  0.2551  0.0281  0.3522  0.0084  0.0167        182 
Spain  0.0217  0.3015  0.1019  0.2216  0.0192  0.0067        184 
Host 
Australia  0.0338  0.7209  0.1344  0.4491  0.0266  0.0141  0.0737  0.0466  193 
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  France  Germany  Italy  Netherlands   
 
Source 
source  host  source  host  source  host  source  host   
United States  0.6661  0.1160  0.6503  0.1645  0.0721  0.0104  10.5764  0.1011   
United Kingdom  0.5726  0.6370  0.3348  0.5412  0.0892  0.0824  4.3388  0.2649   
Austria  0.0133  0.0931  0.0830  0.8442  0.0069  0.0400  0.4940  0.1898   
Belgium                           
France        0.1645  0.2390  0.0850  0.0706  2.3512  0.1291   
Germany  0.3326  0.2289        0.0397  0.0227  2.8226  0.1066   
Italy  0.1155  0.1391  0.0617  0.1081        0.8949  0.0592   
Netherlands  0.2632  4.7957  0.1077  2.8523  0.1717  2.5967         
Norway  0.0196  0.1824  0.0056  0.0757  0.0007  0.0055  0.1956  0.1001   
Sweden  0.0378  0.0066  0.0581  0.0147  0.0046  0.0007  0.7326  0.0070   
Switzerland  0.1070  0.5603  0.0572  0.4354  0.0231  0.1004  1.7004  0.4889   
Canada  0.1582  0.3433  0.0236  0.0743  0.0041  0.0073  0.6300  0.0751   
Japan  0.0537  0.0179  0.0288  0.0139  0.0084  0.0023  0.2918  0.0053   
Finland  0.0041  0.0455  0.0091  0.1457  0.0012  0.0112  0.2061  0.1250   
Greece  0.0058  0.0722  0.0077  0.1395  0.0036  0.0373  0.3343  0.2297   
Ireland  0.0588  1.0710  0.0669  1.7706  0.0266  0.4026  1.3414  1.3414   
Portugal  0.0174  0.2429  0.0143  0.2889  0.0082  0.0943  0.2017  0.1542   
Spain  0.1129  0.2731  0.0563  0.1978  0.0339  0.0681  1.3620  0.1809   
Host 
Australia  0.0225  0.0836  0.0196  0.1056  0.0046  0.0142  0.7249  0.1479   
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  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland  Canada   
 
Source 
source  host  source  host  source  host  source  host   
United States  0.2470  0.0046  0.0226  0.0226  1.8723  0.0622  1.2120  0.0972   
United Kingdom  0.3060  0.0365  0.0184  0.1177  0.8926  0.1896  0.2792  0.1431   
Austria  0.0304  0.0228  0.0004  0.0162  0.0988  0.1320  0.0034  0.0108   
Belgium  0.4630  0.2918        0.3193  0.3584         
France  0.0928  0.0100  0.0089  0.0512  0.2122  0.0405  0.0837  0.0386   
Germany  0.3041  0.0224  0.0137  0.0543  0.5071  0.0666  0.0289  0.0092   
Italy  0.0237  0.0031  0.0052  0.0359  0.3404  0.0783  0.0083  0.0046   
Netherlands  0.1770  0.3457  0.0158  1.6565  0.3684  1.2814  0.2184  1.8333   
Norway        0.0128  0.6853  0.0980  0.1746  0.0016  0.0070   
Sweden  0.4273  0.0080        0.1303  0.0043  0.0287  0.0023   
Switzerland  0.0111  0.0062  0.0035  0.1050        0.0867  0.2093   
Canada  0.0939  0.0218  0.0012  0.0153  0.1250  0.0518         
Japan  0.0019  0.0001  0.0004  0.0007  0.0876  0.0056  0.1048  0.0161   
Finland  0.0725  0.0859  0.0308  1.9554  0.0305  0.0644  0.0024  0.0122   
Greece  0.0027  0.0036  0.0000  0.0022  0.0439  0.1050  0.0024  0.0138   
Ireland  0.1090  0.2128  0.0086  0.8952  0.1486  0.5169  0.0086  0.0723   
Portugal  0.0058  0.0087  0.0005  0.0366  0.0654  0.1738  0.0218  0.1401   
Spain  0.0594  0.0154  0.0017  0.0237  0.1786  0.0825  0.0239  0.0266   
Host 
Australia  0.0102  0.0040  0.0005  0.0108  0.1026  0.0728  0.0783  0.1341   
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  Japan  Finland  Greece  Ireland   
 
Source 
source  host  source  host  source  host  source  host   
United States  0.4363  0.2283  0.7384  0.0116  0.0517  0.0007  2.2877  0.0219   
United Kingdom  0.1355  0.4533  0.2971  0.0299  0.0912  0.0081  0.8013  0.0489   
Austria  0.0009  0.0197  0.0273  0.0173  0.0009  0.0005  0.0022  0.0008   
Belgium  0.0115  0.2039                     
France  0.0246  0.0739  0.2059  0.0186  0.0063  0.0005  0.4087  0.0224   
Germany  0.0168  0.0348  0.6342  0.0395  0.0153  0.0008  0.5556  0.0210   
Italy  0.0038  0.0136  0.0683  0.0074  0.0023  0.0002  0.1225  0.0081   
Netherlands  0.0775  4.2425  0.8166  1.3470  0.0071  0.0104  1.3921  1.3921   
Norway  0.0024  0.0663  0.4541  0.3836  0.0004  0.0003  0.0083  0.0042   
Sweden  0.0018  0.0010  1.6341  0.0258  0.0015  0.0000  0.0285  0.0003   
Switzerland  0.0049  0.0765  0.5742  0.2723  0.0040  0.0017         
Canada  0.0180  0.1174  0.0888  0.0175  0.0048  0.0008         
Japan        0.0384  0.0012  0.0006  0.0000  0.1893  0.0035   
Finland  0.0013  0.0424        0.0004  0.0004  0.0570  0.0346   
Greece  0.0000  0.0012  0.0045  0.0051        0.0035  0.0024   
Ireland  0.0071  0.3873  0.0765  0.1262  0.0100  0.0145         
Portugal  0.0006  0.0242  0.0190  0.0239  0.0043  0.0048  0.0906  0.0693   
Spain  0.0058  0.0422  0.0457  0.0100  0.0044  0.0009  0.3936  0.0523   
Host 
Australia  0.0443  0.4954  0.0376  0.0127  0.0008  0.0002  0.0657  0.0134   
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  Portugal  Spain  Australia       
 
Source 
source  host  source  host  source  host       
United States  0.0387  0.0005  0.2079  0.0150  0.6272  0.0294       
United Kingdom  0.0714  0.0057  0.1613  0.0742  0.4286  0.1283       
Austria  0.0210  0.0106  0.0133  0.0385  0.0003  0.0006       
Belgium              0.0144  0.0228       
France  0.0497  0.0036  0.0977  0.0404  0.0100  0.0027       
Germany  0.0150  0.0007  0.2154  0.0613  0.0168  0.0031       
Italy  0.0321  0.0028  0.0896  0.0446  0.0128  0.0041       
Netherlands  0.5102  0.6675  0.1753  1.3203  0.0747  0.3660       
Norway  0.0001  0.0001  0.0035  0.0135  0.0004  0.0010       
Sweden  0.0003  0.0000  0.0101  0.0007  0.0023  0.0001       
Switzerland  0.0092  0.0035  0.1071  0.2319  0.0048  0.0067       
Canada  0.0038  0.0006  0.0135  0.0121  0.0524  0.0306       
Japan  0.0000  0.0000  0.0208  0.0029  0.0164  0.0015       
Finland  0.0000  0.0000  0.0046  0.0211  0.0003  0.0008       
Greece  0.0059  0.0053  0.0087  0.0448  0.0000  0.0000       
Ireland  0.0653  0.0854  0.0259  0.1947  0.0186  0.0911       
Portugal        0.1373  0.7905  0.0001  0.0002       
Spain  0.6530  0.1135        0.0025  0.0016       
Host 
Australia  0.0007  0.0002  0.0220  0.0339               47 














     
  1  2 
 
productivity  Effective tax 
rate 
Capital-Labor ratio  1.808E-04    
   (6.09e-06)**    
Years of schooling  1.262    
   (0.092)**    
Tax rate     0.642 
      (0.005)** 
GDP per capita     3.19e-06 
      (1.5e-07)** 
Observations  4279  5414 
R-squared  0.958  0.962 
     
Note:     
Standard errors in parentheses;   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;   48 
Table A.3: Bilateral FDI Flows and Selection Equations: Productivity 
and Tax Effects 
         
  1  2 
  Flow  Selection  Flow  Selection 
Productivity - source  -0.060  -0.051       
   (0.020)**  (0.026)      
Productivity - host  0.018  0.006      
   (0.018)  (0.031)      
Instrumented productivity - source       -0.089  -0.135 
        (0.033)**  (0.054)* 
Instrumented productivity - host       -0.039  0.040 
        (0.036)  (0.046) 
Tax rate - source  1.036  1.212      
   (0.652)  (0.826)      
Tax rate - host  -2.747  -0.612      
   (0.655)**  (0.787)      
Instrumented effective tax rate - source 
    
1.473  0.924 
        (1.036)  (1.375) 
Instrumented effective tax rate - host 
    
-5.388  -1.489 
         (1.115)**  (1.244) 
GDP per capita - source^  5.419  1.666  3.383  0.895 
   (0.949)**  (1.222)  (0.657)**  (0.725) 
GDP per capita - host^  2.766  -1.152  4.890  -1.192 
   (0.878)**  (1.342)  (0.624)**  (0.834) 
Schooling difference  0.174  -0.019  0.104  0.053 
   (0.066)**  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.083) 
Common language  0.513  -0.182  0.495  -0.094 
   (0.090)**  (0.118)  (0.106)**  (0.148) 
Distance^  -1.015  -0.306  -1.082  -0.393 
   (0.044)**  (0.074)**  (0.048)**  (0.089)** 
Population - source^  0.712  -3.860  -1.006  -7.596 
   (1.788)  (2.556)  (2.058)  (2.986)* 
Population - host^  -1.738  -5.398  -0.081  -8.931 
   (1.493)  (2.633)*  (1.689)  (3.023)** 
Financial risk - source  -0.026  0.023  -0.012  0.011 
   (0.012)*  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.025) 
Financial risk - host  -0.020  -0.027  -0.029  -0.015 
   (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.013)*  (0.020) 
Previous FDI dummy (1 if yes)     1.534    1.501 
      (0.085)**     (0.093)** 
Observations  4702  4702  3833  3833 
         
Note:         
^ In logs;          
Country and time fixed effects are accounted for; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         